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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                          
No. 08-3811
____________
HOSSIN Z. MOHAMMAD,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM AN ORDER DATED
AUGUST 12, 2008, OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(BIA-1: A97-537-486)
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
DECEMBER 15, 2009
Before:   SLOVITER, JORDAN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 29, 2010)
____________
OPINION 
                         
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Hosin Z. Mohammad, a citizen of Bangladesh, illegally entered the United
States in January 2008.  He conceded removability, but applied for political asylum,
  We have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 81
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
2
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  An
Immigration Judge denied Mohammad’s applications and ordered that he be removed
from the country.  The BIA affirmed, and Mohammad timely petitioned for review.   We1
will deny the petition. 
Mohammad contends that he was erroneously denied asylum because it was
wrongly concluded that he had not suffered past persecution.  He also argues that both the
IJ and BIA incorrectly determined that his alleged well-founded fear of future persecution
had been rebutted.  
The IJ received evidence that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”)
controlled the Bangladesh government until October 2006.  At that time power was
transferred to a caretaker regime, which has, among other things, arrested the leaders of
both the BNP and the Awami League, Bangladesh’s two main political parties.
Mohammad testified that he was a member of the BNP and, in late October
2006 and after the caretaker government had assumed power, was attacked at a political
meeting by members of the Awami League.  He sustained injuries to his wrist and hands. 
After recovering, Mohammad continued his political activities on behalf of the BNP
despite threatening phone calls from Awami League members.
In February 2007, Mohammad traveled to Tongi, another town in
3Bangladesh, to escape the Awami League threats and the police.  In March 2007, he went
to India and stayed there for three months before returning to Bangladesh, where he
resided unmolested until coming to the United States.  
He now claims that he will be killed by the Awami League if returned to Bangladesh.
The IJ concluded that Mohammad had not met the requirements for asylum
because he had failed to demonstrate past persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
(discussing asylum eligibility).  The evidence did not reveal either that the police abused
him or that the Awami League’s members who attacked and threatened him were
members of the government, sanctioned by the government, or acted with impunity.  See
Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 2003) (applicant must show that past
persecution “[wa]s committed either by the government or by forces that the government
[wa]s either unable or unwilling to control”).  
In addition, the IJ found that the evidence did not support a finding of an
objective fear of future persecution because Mohammad was able to leave and return to
Bangladesh, as well as live and travel around the country for months after the attack,
without a problem.  See id. (if past persecution is not shown, an applicant may still be
eligible for asylum if he has “a well-founded fear of future persecution by showing that [
]he has a genuine fear, and that a reasonable person in h[is] circumstances would fear
persecution if returned to h[is] native country” (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330
F.3d 587, 592 (3d Cir. 2003))).
4The BIA concluded that, even if Mohammad had shown past persecution,
the government had rebutted any claim to a well-founded fear of future persecution
because the current conditions in Bangladesh make it unlikely that the Awami League
could act with impunity.  In addition, Mohammad was able to relocate to another town
without difficulty.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(A)-(B).   
We find no reversible error in the decisions of the IJ and BIA.  See Leia v.
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 433 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (we review both the IJ’s and BIA’s
decisions when the BIA affirms the IJ, but “also set[s] forth somewhat its own rationale
and analysis”).  Substantial evidence supports the order of removal, and nothing in the
record compels a contrary finding.  See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.
2003) (conclusions on past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecution are
factual findings that “must be upheld ‘unless the evidence not only supports a contrary
conclusion, but compels it’” (quoting Adbille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483084 (3d Cir.
2001))).   
Mohammad also argues that he should have been granted withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  However, because Mohammad
did not satisfy the requirements for asylum, he cannot meet those for withholding of
removal.  See Mulanga, 349 F.3d at 132 (an alien who fails to demonstrate well-founded
fear of future persecution for purposes of asylum cannot overcome standard for
withholding of removal).  Nor has he demonstrated eligibility for protection pursuant to
5the Convention Against Torture by showing that, upon his return to Bangladesh, he is
likely to suffer “severe pain and suffering” inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).  
Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.
